Realism And Anti-Realism

This course acquaints students with some major and widely influential developments in recent work in the theory of meaning relevant to the issue of realism and anti-realism.

By the end of the course, students should be able to:
1. Explain the opposition between realist and anti-realist approaches as developed in the work of Michael Dummett and others.
2. Set forth and critically assess the principal arguments directed against a realist conception of evidence-transcendent truth, including, centrally, the acquisition and manifestation arguments.
3. Evaluate a range of realist attempts to answer these arguments.
4. Discuss the implications for the theory of meaning of supplanting truth, as its central notion, by some epistemically constrained notion such as warranted assertibility.
5. Explain and assess the central ideas and arguments in Hilary Putnam's attack on metaphysical realism and his advocacy of internal realism.
6. Critically assess, in particular, Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism.
7. Expound and explain the radical interpretations, advanced by Saul Kripke and Crispin Wright, of the significance of Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following.
8. Set forth and assess the argument Kripke derives from Wittgenstein's discussions for the 'Sceptical Conclusion' that there are no facts about meaning (semantic irrealism).
9. Assess Kripke's 'Sceptical Solution'.
10. Explain and evaluate the claim that semantic irrealism is unstable because it leads to the conclusion that there are no facts of any kind at all.
11. Discuss the apparent implications of Wright's interpretation of the rule-following considerations for the objectivity of the notions of meaning and truth, and in particular, his ensuing rejection of the notion of investigation-independent fact.

Assessment
An essay of 1500 to 2000 words (30%) and a two-hour examination (70%).